Long-Sought, Post-September 11 Memo Points to Divergence Between Public Optimism and Private Concerns
An October 2001 memorandum confirming that the administration of then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani understood the potential health dangers posed by toxic debris from the destruction of the World Trade Center, even as spokesmen urged the public to return to Lower Manhattan, has been found.
911 Health Watch, a nonprofit that seeks to ensure the federal government’s long-term commitment to the well-being of September 11 responders, survivors, and their families, announced on February 5 that the so-called “Harding Memo” was located after a multi-year search. This memo has been referenced in numerous publications in the years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but its original text has never before been made public.
The confidential memo from Michelle Goldstein, a lobbyist working for City Hall, to then-Deputy Mayor for Economic Development Robert Harding, warned, “according to the Law Department, there are approximately 35,000 potential plaintiffs as a result of the events of September 11 and it is estimate[d] that 10,000 would file a claim. A major concern is that if these cases make it to court, the judges and juries will be biased in favor of plaintiffs (even though the City seems to have a strong defense) and therefore award substantial damages to compensate individuals for their loss.” The memo went on to anticipate “direct effect” lawsuits, arising from “public safety officers directing individuals who relied (to their detriment) on the direction.” Further grounds for litigation, Ms. Goldstein predicted, could arise from “health advisories [that] caused individuals… to return to the area too soon (causing toxic exposure or emotional harm).” She anticipated a wave of “toxic tort cases that might arise in the next few decades.”
Even as this memo was circulating out of public view among senior staff at City Hall under the title “Legislative Alternatives to Limit the City’s Liability Relating to 9/11/01,” Giuliani administration spokesmen were telling New Yorkers that “the general public’s risk for any short- or long-term adverse health effects are very low” (five days after September 11); that “the air quality is safe and acceptable” (17 days after); and that “despite the smoky conditions in areas of Lower Manhattan that are close to the World Trade Center site, test results from the ongoing monitoring of airborne contaminants indicate that the levels continue to be below the level of concern to public health” (24 days after).
Without adequate warning of the dangers posed by more than 2,500 contaminants (including asbestos, lead, mercury, dioxins, crystalline silica, cadmium, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, along with pulverized concrete and glass) now known to have filled the air and coated every surface for hundreds of yards in all directions, thousands of first responders and cleanup workers flocked to the site, and tens of thousands of local residents returned to their homes. In the decades since, the death toll among these groups has surpassed the number killed during the actual attacks, while the count of those sickened with the 80-plus conditions subsequently linked to exposure to World Trade Center debris is now many times the tally of the dead.
Although Mr. Giuliani said little in public about the dangers posed by environmental toxins at Ground Zero during the three months that remained in his tenure after September 11, 2001, one indication of his frame of mind might be gleaned from an action he took in November. The Mayor urged members of New York’s Congressional delegation to help pass the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which specifically capped “the liability for all claims against the City of New York as a result of such attacks to no more than the City’s insurance coverage or $350 million.”
The Harding Memo was originally obtained by the late investigative reporter Wayne Barrett while researching his 2007 book, “Grand Illusion: The Untold Story of Rudy Giuliani and 9/11 – An Authoritative Political Biography of Leadership Mythology, Security Failures, and Accountability.” When Mr. Barrett died in 2017, his family donated his papers to the Dolph Briscoe Center for American History at the University of Texas at Austin.
Attorneys for 911 Health Watch contacted the Briscoe Center in December, asking that they search Mr. Barrett’s papers for this document, even though no mention of it appeared in their index. After combing through their archive for more than a month, Briscoe Center staff found the Harding Memo and forwarded a copy to Ben Chevat, the executive director of 911 Health Watch.
Mr. Chevat said, “this memo confirms what survivors have long suspected: that the City knew people were being exposed to danger, knew it would lead to illness and lawsuits, and prioritized limiting its own liability over full transparency.”
Newly elected City Council Speaker Julie Menin (who previously served as chair of Community Board 1) said, “like tens of thousands of New Yorkers, I lived and worked in Lower Manhattan, my small business was devastated, and I was part of a community that was told it was safe to return while serious risks remained unresolved. The release of the Harding Memo raises serious questions about what the City knew in the weeks after the attacks and how those risks were addressed. Transparency and accountability are essential in honoring the victims and ensuring we have a full record of September 11’s horrific health impacts.”
Andrew Carboy, a pro bono lawyer for 911 Health Watch in its ongoing lawsuit against the City to compel the release of documents similar to the Harding Memo, said, “after years of pursuing it in Court, it is heartbreaking to finally obtain this memo. We read, with our own eyes, that City Hall worried more about losing lawsuits than losing lives. Even after the memo circulated in the Mayor’s Office, in October 2001, the City continued to message the public that the air of Lower Manhattan was safe and acceptable. We believe there are other documents like the Harding memo to be revealed. We will continue to fight the City’s stonewalling of any additional risk assessments.”
Matthew McCauley, another pro bono lawyer for 911 Health Watch, said, “despite that we had to go to Texas to get a document that was sent from Church Street to City Hall, which the City of New York still has not produced after years of requests, that is not the most outrageous part of today’s chapter of this unnecessary mystery. What is outrageous and chilling is the concerns the City had about whether the actions of our heroes, including those who died, would result in litigation. While there are some health concerns vaguely listed thereafter, the City ends the memo in detail about the concerns of liability associated with the contractors and personnel who were working at Ground Zero in the recovery effort. Are we to believe that these are the only two pages the City is still refusing to produce? This is why 911 Health Watch continues its mission.”